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Nowadays food products are produced in vertically collaborating networks. The questions of
how such chain networks have to be designed and which governance structure fits best have
been addressed in several well known articles. However, questions dealing with chain strategy
and management are not discussed satisfyingly. Neither is the understanding of what is success
of chain management distinguished. 
Keywords: Chain management, Network goals, Success
1.   Introduction
Since the beginning of food processing the product flow has not been changed substantially.
However, this is certainly not true for food products themselves. Instead of an inspection and
experience good, today food is perceived as a complex bundle of inspection, experience, and
credence characteristics. In Western Europe and the US, this development has been catalysed
by different circumstances including food crises, the demand for organic food and consequent
traceability requirements. Additionally, the contemporary discussion on labelling of GMO adds
to the complexity of modern food products. 
Comprising, the requirements of food products have led to the demand of a transparent produc-
tion chain. Thus, this has led to a high demand for availability of information making informa-
tion a competitive must. Nevertheless, in order to get a competitive advantage, these
information requirements have to be transformed into knowledge creating an inimitable and
non-substitutable asset. In favour of these aspects, the food chain is in the progress to be re-de-
signed into vertically coordinated organisations. These organisations that contain various firms
and that are sequentially connected can be called supply chain networks. 
The questions of how such chain networks have to be designed and which governance structure
fits best have been addressed in several well known articles (GULATI ET AL., 2000; HENDRIKSE,
2003; OMTA ET AL., 2001; LAZZARINI ET AL., 2001). However, questions dealing with chain
strategy and management are not discussed satisfyingly. Neither is the understanding of what is
success of supply chain networks distinguished. Therefore, the aim of this paper is not to im-
prove the discussion of the government of chain networks. Instead, we want to enhance the dis-
cussion on the successful coordination of vertical network, i.e. successful chain management. 
In this context, we will first outline the concepts of networks and supply chain networks. Adja-
cent, we will elaborate on the issues of a chain management and its success. And finally, we will
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2 .   The Conceptualisation of Supply Chain Networks
Traditionally economics discussed two forms of business transactions. One was through (spot)
market transactions and the other was by vertical integration. Nevertheless, institutional econo-
mics introduced different approaches in the form of hybrid organisational concepts. Hybrid
forms are the systematic optimisation of activities through inter-firm coordination and coopera-
tion. In general, market transactions are perceived to be unable to pool capabilities and re-
sources of different economic actors while with vertical integration the flexibility and market
incentives are lost (ILIOPOULOS, 2003). In the following sections we will concentrate on one
specific form of hybrid – the network approach.
2.1   Networks
Network is a term, widely spread in sociology and management sciences. This term covers all
arrangements defining recurrent contractual ties among autonomous entities (MENARD, 2002).
Generally, networks can be defined as “specific properties of the transaction relationships, ty-
pified by relational relationships in which formal and informal sharing and trust building me-
chanisms are crucial” (ZYLBERSZTAJN AND FARINA, 2003). Networks do not solely address
vertically organised ties. They rather more generally cover all questions on inter-organisational
relationships of more than two firms (LAZZARINI ET AL., 2001). 
In network science the collaboration is determined by different forces e.g. complementary abi-
lities of the involved firms and risk reduction (MENARD, 2002). While traditionally the resour-
ce-based view of the firm focused on the intra-firm creation of core competencies as a
competitive advantage (BARNEY, 1991; PRAHALAD AND HAMEL, 1990), GULATI ET AL. (2000)
amplified it in such a way that inter-firm networks can be seen as an origin of inimitable re-
sources creating inimitable and non-substitutable value. By a comparison of a multiunit organi-
sation with a network, TSAI (2000) showed that units rich in social capital and strategic
relatedness are more likely to realise potential synergies in related business operations. Organi-
sations are more capable to ascertain and utilise new opportunities and to react accurately to the
potential change of internal and external environment as well as strategic and tactical actions
(WIKLUND AND SHEPHERD, 2003). Especially, the transfer and creation of explicit and implicit
knowledge within the network by cooperation permits the network to be more competitive.
Mainly organisational knowledge gains in importance as it has the ability to serve as a source
of sustainable differentiation and is inherently difficult to imitate. By formal and informal
knowledge (e.g. routines), contractual rules can be substituted lowering transaction costs and
information asymmetries. In an environment where the survival of organisations depends on the
ability to be innovative (HAYEK, 1949), the firm’s success is determined by its dynamic capa-
bilities, i.e. the ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external resources and
competencies (TEECE ET AL., 1997). Particularly, for product innovations a coordination of
knowledge between the different ties of a chain network might enhance the chance creating a
successful new product. Within networks, firms are embedded in upstream and downstream
flows of resources, information, and knowledge. Hence, networks can influence the nature of
competition and the profitability beyond traditional measures of industry competition (GULATI
ET AL., 2000).
By focusing on core competencies, a single company is able to capture the returns of applying
economies of learning, scale and scope on one hand. On the other hand, this firm faces the high
risk of specialised production orientation. By collaboration, specialised firms are able to share
their strengths to create a more competitive entity and simultaneously reduce firm individualTaras Gagalyuk and Jon Hanf   423
risks as well as to increase sales and revenues (ARBEITSKREIS, 1995). Besides such financial
incentives, also non-pecuniary incentives like knowledge generation, power, and trust are key
concepts in the network theory that motivate economic actors to work together (UZZI, 1997).
The role the single firm plays within the network is determined by its power, its competencies,
its interests, existing rules, and the aim of the network (OMTA ET AL., 2001). Through mutual
dependency of assets developed within networks, companies can secure the investments they
have made to sustain the network (MENARD, 2002). This means that both parties have an interest
in a true partnership. A true partnership implies that common values exist based on loyalty and
trustworthiness within a network. However, there are also some constraints in networks: diver-
gent aims of the actors, information asymmetries, partitioning of gains and losses, opportunistic
behaviour, etc. (ARBEITSKREIS, 1995). To overcome the constraints and to achieve the gains,
collaboration ought to have shared values, trustworthiness, as well as shared knowledge and a
shared strategy (HANF AND KÜHL, 2003).
A more differentiated approach to networks is taken by BURR (1999) who classifies four net-
work typologies. They are namely the spontaneous network, self-organising network, project-
orientated network, and strategic network. This typology is derived from the intensity of relati-
ons, the coordination mechanism, and the existence of a broker. In the subsequent thoughts we
will focus on strategic networks. In such a pyramidal-hierarchical network, a strategy-leading
focal company is the core element of the network being either manufacturer or retailer. The fo-
cal firm is expected to manage the system in order to realise the strategic objectives. 
2.2   Supply chain networks
As shown, networks could be used for the organisation of horizontal and vertical cooperation.
However, nowadays in the agri-food business vertical linkages are relevant in order to satisfy
the consumer requirements. Therefore, an explicit vertical form of networks is introduced in this
paper. Under a supply chain network we understand the joint and cooperative behaviour and ac-
tions of companies that are related by vertical product and information flows in the supply chain
in order to provide a product or service to the end consumer. The objective of most of the supply
chain networks is to produce higher quality and/or higher efficiency by cooperation rather than
by full integration of the supply chain or by market transactions (HANF AND KÜHL, 2002, LAZ-
ZARINI ET AL., 2001; NEVES 2003; ZYLBERSZTAJN AND FARINA, 2003). Within such pyramidal-
hierarchic strategic networks (GULATI ET AL., 2000; JARILLO, 1988; WILDEMANN, 1997) the fo-
cal company or chain captain is liable with its reputation for each product being produced by its
supply chain network (SCN). The increasing importance of reputation or brand image can be
observed for example by the retailer’s efforts to create a brand for their own company (HANF
AND HANF, 2003). Since the chain captain is liable without limitation for the correctness of the
production i.e. for all credence characteristics, he must avoid any type of defect within the entire
network. 
Hence, the focal company has to set incentives to create a situation, in which every actor has
self-interest to secure the sustainable stability of the whole network (PICOT ET AL., 2001). On
one hand, these incentives must be of monetary nature to create a short-term win-win situation
(i.e. higher profits). On the other hand, the incentives have to be of non-pecuniary nature to crea-
te a long-lasting “unique relationship proposition”, which cannot be imitated easily by compe-
titors. Exclusive benefits can include higher profits or joint growth in the future. Nevertheless,
for some participants of the network this might be just to stay in business. The cooperation in
SCN relies on confidence and understanding. These characteristics have to grow over a long
time and create the space to achieve a superior joint solution of a problem (HANF AND KÜHL,
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Especially in the food business, where numerous SME are active, cooperative networks give
those enterprises the chance to concentrate on their core competencies. By cooperating, SME
can better exploit their core competencies and reduce at the same time the inherent risk by fo-
cussing on single activities. Because of this structure, the focal company has to consider that
such companies do not dispose of a sophisticated IT-infrastructure and high manpower. Addi-
tionally, single SME do not dispose of a sufficient quantity of commodities in order to supply
the whole demand of the network. Particularly for agricultural goods, the total amount of supply
needed has to be delivered by various farmers. For this reason, horizontal cooperation has to be
installed being managed by the focal company itself or by a system supplier. 
3.   Strategic chain management
Food supply chains consist of a number of consecutive stages and at each stage of one or more
independent firms so that the material and information flows have to be coordinated as to ti-
ming, quantity, quality and other aspects. On account of this, vertical cooperation between firms
requires a great deal of coordination among them. Though in the organisational theory coope-
ration and coordination are both attributed to integration, GULATI ET AL. (2005) stress that there
are distinct differences between them. We will explain subsequently these differences and their
implications in detail.
In the context of SCN, cooperation refers to the alignment of interests. Thus, problems of co-
operation accrue from conflicts of interests (GULATI ET AL., 2005). These conflicts arise becau-
se self-interested individuals optimise their own private benefits before they strive for
collectively beneficial outcomes. GULATI ET AL. (2005) conclude that the problem of coopera-
tion can be regarded as a problem of motivation. To overcome this problem, formal and infor-
mal mechanisms can be used. Formal mechanisms include: contracting, common ownership of
assets, monitoring and sanctions, and prospect of future interactions. Informal mechanisms are
identification and embeddedness (GULATI, 1995). 
Coordination can be understood as the alignment of actions. Coordination problems arise if ac-
tors are not aware that their actions are interdependent. In general, interdependency is created
when decisions and actions by one partner influence the decisions and actions of partnering
firms (THEUVSEN, 2004). There are three types of interdependencies: i) horizontal or pooled in-
terdependencies between firms competing in the same market, ii) vertical interdependencies
between firms operating in different markets but linked by sequential work flows where the out-
put of one is the input of the other, and iii) symbiotic or reciprocal interdependencies between
firms that complement each other or have reciprocal product and/or information flows (ASTLEY
AND FOMBRUN, 1983; LAZZARINI ET AL., 2001). Another reason for coordination problems is
the uncertainty about others’ rationality so that one does not know how the others will act. Thus,
problems of coordination are results of the lack of shared and accurate knowledge about the de-
cision rules that others are likely to use and how one’s own actions are interdependent with tho-
se of the others (GULATI ET AL., 2005). Again, there are formal and informal mechanisms to
overcome coordination problems. Formal mechanisms can be derived from the literature on in-
tra-organizational coordination (MARCH AND SIMON, 1958; THOMPSON, 1967). They include
programming, hierarchy, and feedback. In order to enhance the predictability of the others’ ac-
tions, schedules and standards are installed. Such ex ante agreements can be regarded as pro-
gramming. A stronger way to enhance predictability is to introduce hierarchal elements, such as
single sources of authority and centralised decision making. Integrating feedback processes
helps to enable mutual adjustment on an ongoing basis (THOMPSON, 1967). Informal mecha-
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and experience, trustworthiness, and a shared strategy (HANF AND KÜHL, 2005).
GULATI ET AL. (2005) deduce that even though cooperation may be achieved, i.e. the interests
of the individual actors are aligned, the coordination problems may persist. Thus, both, the ali-
gnment of interests as well as the alignment of actions have to be simultaneously achieved in
order to create a successful partnership. For this, collective strategies must be implemented by
chain actors. The management literature on (intra-firm) coordination usually distinguishes bet-
ween two types of strategies – corporate and business strategies. This distinction is not sufficient
for an adequate consideration of the multiple linkages which exist between interdependent or-
ganisations within a chain network (BRESSER AND HARL, 1986). Thus, various authors have in-
troduced the concept of collective strategies1 (ASTLEY, 1984; CARNEY, 1987) regarded as
instruments dealing with the variation in the inter-organisational environment. So they aim to
stabilise and dominate the interdependent task environment (BRESSER AND HARL, 1986). In this
context, collective strategies can be re-active, absorbing variation within an environment, or
they can be pro-active forestalling unpredictable behaviour by other organisations (ASTLEY
AND FOMBRUN, 1983). 
Another reason to implement collective strategies is to overcome coordination difficulties ari-
sing from interdependencies among the firms. In order to use collective strategies to overcome
coordination problems, the focal company (as the centralised decision making unit in pyrami-
dal-hierarchical strategic networks) has to consider three different types of interdependencies.
LAZZARINI ET AL. (2001) provide the advice to exert managerial discretion for sequential (ver-
tical) interdependencies; to achieve process standardisation – for pooled interdependencies; and
to maintain coordination through mutual adjustments – for reciprocal interdependencies. 
The cooperation problem of aligning of the interests of individual partners in supply chain net-
works is addressed by partnering strategies. Partnering is a term that addresses issues which are
associated with the design of relationships within a supply chain. Partnerships exhibit a certain
degree of continuity and the focus of the relationships goes beyond price (MENTZER ET AL.,
2000). Considering supply chain networks and the heterogeneity of their member firms, it can
be expected that an optimal mode of partnerships widely varies along the whole chain. Thus,
the focal company has to work out how the partnerships should be designed. WEBSTER (1992)
proposed a continuum from independent partnerships to strategic partnerships. In our paper, we
use the typology of MENTZER ET AL. (2000) dividing partnering into strategic and operational.
Specifically, they define strategic partnering as an “on-going, long-term, inter-firm relationship
for achieving strategic goals, which deliver value to customers and profitability to partners”
(MENTZER ET AL., 2000). The aim of strategic partnering is to improve or dramatically alter a
company’s competitive position through the development of new products, technologies and
markets (WEBSTER, 1992). Additionally, strategic partnering should also include exclusivity
and non-imitability (MENTZER ET AL., 2000). Operational partnering is defined as a “needed,
short-term relationship for obtaining parity with competitors” (MENTZER ET AL., 2000). Thus,
an operational partnering strategy seeks to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness.
Such strategic orientation involves shorter time spans and less organisational resources. There-
fore, operational partnership is much easier to implement and also to reverse than strategic part-
nership (MENTZER ET AL., 2000). 
1. In general, collective strategies are defined as systematic approaches by collaborating organizations that
are jointly developed and implemented (ASTLEY AND FOMBRUN, 1983; ASTLEY, 1984; BRESSER, 1989; BRESSER
AND HARL, 1986; CARNEY, 1987; EDSTRÖM ET AL., 1984; SJURTS, 2000). However, in the context of strategic
networks we consider the focal company as taking the lead.426   Chain Management: All about Success
As shown by GULATI ET AL. (2005), cooperation and coordination are two sides of the same
coin. Based on this, we believe that both aspects have to be integrated in chain management con-
cepts. Additionally, DUYSTERS ET AL. (2004) have shown that collaborations have to be analy-
sed on three different levels in the context of chain management: firm, dyadic, and network
levels. Analyses at the firm level reveal that successful cooperation intensively employs mana-
gerial constructs known from single firms, e.g. alliance database, joint business planning, and
alliance managers. At the dyadic level, the design of governance structure has a significant im-
pact on performance. Further on, at this level, trust and commitment play a particular role for
the success of coordination. Studies at the network level emphasise the role of social capital to
enhance information exchange resulting in information advantages (UZZI  AND G ILLESPIE,
2002). Furthermore, network performance is related to current ties and ties with potential part-
ners. 
4.   What is the successful chain management?
Generally, the success of any kind of activity can be understood as the achievement of the goals
set. However, with regard to chain management the tractability of success is still undetermined
because its goals remain unsystemised. The strand of scientific literature on chain management
is spattered by numerous representations of chain management goals. Nonetheless, there are no
studies that deal with the common bundle of hypotheses aiming, thus, to prove the findings of
other authors (see FETTKE, 2007 for a review). Therefore, for theoretical and empirical use there
is a need to systematically elaborate on success of chain management.
On account of this, the first question to be answered is whether the success of chain management
exists at all. In general, chain management is aimed at the coordination of relationships within
SCN. But does it address the success of the whole SCN? Since SCN are based on formal and
informal contracts between numerous actors, they represent a set of purposeful relationships
and arrangements. This is supported by the implementation of collective strategies aiming to
achieve the inter-firm goals. Supposedly, these goals can be achieved and, therefore, the success
of chain management can really exist. On the other hand, networks are formed by connections
between single firms. This implies that chain management can bring about success to the mem-
bers of an SCN but it can remain unsuccessful as to satisfaction of the overall network goals.
Thus, a conflict can appear regarding the achievement of goals of different network levels, e.g.
between firm and network levels. In this context, another question arises with regard to what the
goals of chain management are and where they come from. Without the clarification of these
goals and their origin, the understanding of what is successful chain management can be hard
to achieve. 
The literature on strategic management suggests that the desired goals and objectives can be
achieved based on a strategy as a long-term plan of actions. In terms of SCN, the above chapters
introduce collective strategies defined as “systematic approaches by collaborating organisations
that are jointly developed and implemented” (BRESSER AND HARL, 1986). On the other hand,
supply chain networks possess a focal firm coordinating the network in a hierarchical style. De-
spite the persistence of mutual dependencies between the network members, the other network
actors are more or less heavily dependent on the focal company because of (long-lasting) expli-
cit or implicit contracts. The level of such dependency is usually higher for vertical than for ho-
rizontal ties (WILDEMANN, 1997). Given the verticalisation conditions, the focal company is,
thus, able to exert power over the other network companies. Therefore, in our opinion, a collec-
tive strategy has to be regarded as a systematic approach that addresses the – by the focal com-
pany induced – alignment of actions and interests of independent but collaborating companies
in order to achieve certain goals. Based on this, the setting of the overall network goals is in most
cases the prerogative of the focal company. Due to this fact, it might be often difficult to distin-Taras Gagalyuk and Jon Hanf   427
guish between the network level goals and the firm level goals (e.g. consumer satisfaction can
be regarded as either a firm level aim of a retailer or a network level aim as its fulfilment invol-
ves many firms but it is addressed by retailer being a focal actor). Because a network consists
of different network levels, we assume that there are not only network-related goals but at least
firm-related goals that have to be met by chain management. Under network-related goals we
understand goals set within a network that can only be met if all networked firms are jointly
working to achieve them. An example is to enhance the total chain quality or to prevent a law
as it was the case of the creation of the German Q&S-System. In general, we suppose that such
aims are rather of non-pecuniary or intangible nature. This is another reason why their indicati-
on is complicated in terms of SCN. Firm-related goals refer to goals that single firms want to
achieve for their own firm entering the network. Examples might be higher sales, risk reduction,
higher profits, or knowledge generation. As seen, the goals of chain management have to be
considered at all (or at least at two) network levels (Table 1). Therefore, the success of an SCN
can be regarded as the simultaneous achievement of network-related goals and goals of (as
many as possible) network members.
Table 1. Chain management goals
Source: Own representation
Considering the approach of HANF AND HANF (2007) who distinguished between operative and
strategic chain management, it gets evident that network goals have to be divided into ones that
aim to achieve parity with the competitors and ones that aim to create a competitive advantage.
Therefore, the collective strategies have to include operative and strategic network goals in or-
der to provide the competitiveness of the network. With regard to competitiveness, an important
source of competitive advantage resides in relational network characteristics. Except for net-
work members, relational network characteristics include the network structure and the tie mo-
dality, i.e. a particular pattern of relationships and features of collaboration, respectively
(GULATI ET AL., 2000). On account of this, the achievement of success requires an appropriate
network structure concerning network density, structural equivalence, etc. Besides, tie modali-
ties have to be optimised with regard to the strength of the connections and the nature of the ties
among firms. Either strong or weak, the inter-firm ties can influence the achievement of opera-
tive and strategic network goals. Additionally, the nature of the relationships – either collabo-
rative or opportunistic – may impact on the success of SCN. An arrangement of appropriate tie
modalities can be perceived as a goal itself, e.g. to deal with the problems of rivalry and oppor-
tunism in networks. 
According to this argumentation, we perceive the duty and responsibility of the focal company
as to work out a strategic setting that outlines the common aims of all participants, considers
incentives on the firm level and includes satisfactory relational characteristics. In order to solve
or prevent conflicts between chain-related (network-related) and firm-specific goals, the focal
company has to elaborate on conflict solving mechanisms. Generally, mechanisms to overcome
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conflicts are named in management literature but they have to be specified to collaboration set-
ting. Because the active part of the strategy setting lies in the responsibility of the focal compa-
ny, we understand the involvement of the other network companies in the strategy outlining
process as being rather indirect. Overall, we assume that most network companies are involved
rather by giving some feedback directly or indirectly (e.g. by opportunistic behaviour). In the
case of strategic families (ALBACH, 1992), a few key suppliers are more closely involved in the
strategy creating process. However, in the agri-food business this is rather the exception than
the rule. 
Moreover, focal companies as the predominant strategy setting unit have to take into account
that the aims and mechanisms of the ‘sub-strategies’ i.e. partnering and supply chain manage-
ment strategies might be conflicting. For sequential interdependencies the introduction of hier-
archies and thereof a clear dispersion of power is a preferable coordination mechanism.
However, from the cooperative perspective power is often perceived as the antipode of trust.
Thus, the inclusion of power as a coordination mechanism might be conflicting with the goal to
create a trustful chain environment. Again, the collective strategy has to include mechanisms to
solve this conflict or at least to minimise to a minimum level.  
5.   Summary
Based on our arguments, it is evident that successful chain management in agri-food business
is a tremendous task. The reason resides in the nature of goals set in supply chain networks. The
process of goal setting in the network is undertaken at least at two levels, i.e. at the network level
and at the firm level. Therefore, potential conflicts between these two levels must be solved in
order to achieve network goals. Additionally, network-level goals are most often set by a focal
firm, i.e. at the firm level. This can lead to impediments in achieving network goals due to
misunderstanding of their importance by other network actors. Furthermore, collective strate-
gies used in supply chain networks may pursue goals which can also be conflicting. In this con-
text, the task of the focal company is to implement collective strategies which are maximally
understandable, with least contradicting goals, and consider the common and single aims of all
network members including incentives at the firm level.
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